The contribution examines Goodman's conception of philosophy, in particular his remark that his project can be understood as a «critique of worldmaking». It is argued that, despite dealing with epistemological questions, the general theory of symbols and worldmaking does not answer them. Rather, it can be conceived as a practical conception comparable to Kant's critique of reason or to Wittgenstein's critique of language games, i. e., as a philosophy of world orient ation. It is claimed that Goodman himself could not artic ulate this dimension of his position appropriately as he kept using the language of epistemology. Yet many aspects of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted with in a non-epistemological frame. Keywords: Goodman; symbol theory; worldmaking; world orientation; world disclosure.
Introduction
In Ways of Worldmaking, Nelson Goodman describes his philosophical project as a critique of worldmaking: «Worlds are made by making [...] versions with words, numerals, pictures, sounds, or other symbols of any kind in any medium; and the comparative study of these versions and visions and of their making is what I call a critique of worldmaking» (WW, 94) . Elsewhere Goodman says that his «main under taking [...] is examination and compar ison of the ways we make what we make -call them versions or worlds as you like -and of the criteria we use in judging what we make» (MM, 43). -What does the label «critique of world making» exactly mean? What is the conception of philo sophy Goodman has in mind? And how do we have to interpret his general symbol theory if it is primarily a critique of world making?
It is tempting to think that «critique of world making» is just a different label for «epi stemology», only that its scope is broader. One basic assumption of this article, though, is that Goodman is not engaged in epistemology at all, at least not in the usual sense. The question is not whether epistemology has to be conceived narrow or broad. Symbol theory is not so much a theory but rather a practical conception, a certain technique of thinking. This might seem rather far-fetched at first sight, as Goodman more than once emphasizes that a philosopher «is driven not by practical needs but by an impractical desire to understand» (PP, 169) . Even though he discovers language practice as a fundamental point of reference in his theory of induction (especially, FFF, , he never takes into account the details of the pragmatic dimension of sign use and everyday language (Goodman, 1996, 205) . His refusal to go into questions of ethical rightness (WW, 109, Fn. 1) only underlines a general lack of normative discussion in Good man's work. Therefore one is inclined to perceive his «general theory of under stand ing» (R, 53) as a general theory of knowl edge, an extended epistemological con ception concerned with «under-standing or cog nition in all of its modes» (R, 4). Accordingly, rightness is taken to be Goodman's epi stemo logical criterion, representing the standard to separate acceptable from inacceptable world descriptions. Right ness takes the place of truth, only that it is, «unlike truth, [...] multi dimen sional» (R, 156). The expressions may have changed, but the project is still the same.
Here, this perspective is called into question. Goodman, to be sure, uses the vocabulary of epistemology and he starts with the problems of epistemol- ogy. Still, many elements of his thinking become much clearer if they are interpreted in a frame beyond epistemology. His philosophy is done more justice if one presupposes that it does not answer to epistemological questions. In order to show this, I will first examine some of Goodman's early general con sider ations on philo sophy, in particular the idea of constructional systems (2). Second, I will try to develop my thesis in the context of his later philosophy of symbols and worldmaking (3). Finally I will come back to the question of epi stemology (4) and try to give an alternative account of what «critique of world making» might mean (5). My claim will be that this label points into the direction of a practical reflection comparable to Kant's critique of reason or to Witt gen stein's critique of language games, i. e., as a philosophy of world orient ation and world disclosure under the conditions of finiteness -a claim which, of course, does not include a «truth about Good man», but only suggests a certain way of ca tegorization.
Constructionalism and the idea of mapmaking
Goodman's philosophical work contains many issues from quite diverse fields like ontology, logic, epistemology, symbol theory and aesthetics. It would be difficult to extract his conception of philosophy from this starting point. So what does he say about his notion of philosophy?
In the final chapter of Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sci ences, under the heading «A Reconception of Philosophy», we find the idea of a three-staged under taking that starts with the examination of symbols, then turns to their constitutive meaning for world dis closure, and finally results in a revision of philosophy (R, 164). The consider ations of Languages of Art, then, could be the first step of a project that continues with Ways of Worldmaking, and ends with the outline of a new notion of philo sophy. This notion, though, is presented as a certain epi stemological position called «constructionalism» (R, 166) . In the follow ing, I claim that Good man's thinking implicitly suggests a much more radically revised conception of philo sophy. Indeed, the label «epistemology» is misleading here, as the philo sophy of worldmaking should better be interpreted as a conception presupposing a primacy of practice. In order to show this, though, we have to go back to The Structure of Appearance and Problems and Projects.
One of the main motives in Goodman's early work is his repudiation of the ideas of certainty and immediacy. The position that becomes apparent in The Structure of Appear ance seems to be the result: Goodman obviously rejects any epistemological founda tion alism in favor of an epistemological stance called pheno menalism. But the second sight shows that things are slightly more complicated. Goodman does develop a phenomenalistic system in his early work. Yet this does not mean that he supports phenomenalism as the right system of epistemology. Indeed, in the introduction to The Structure of Appear ance it is underlined that the frame of the con ception is the theory of constructional systems which includes strong relativist and pluralist assumptions, in particular the assumption that phenomenalism is only one of many possibilities of reconstruction (SA, il-l) . His con ception must not be taken as an immediate expression of Good man's philo so phical standpoint. He does not want to explain the world or give a fundament to knowledge. His aim is to systematize knowledge. The phenomenalist conception is rather an example of the philosophical stance Good man takes. From the view point of the phenomenalist theory, the basic assumptions of this position are part of a meta theory (Hellmann 1977, xxvi f and SA, l) .
What we have to ask, then, is what this metatheory, namely the theory of constructional systems implies. Goodman develops this theory in the first part of The Structure of Appear ance. A constructional system is a system of constructional definitions, i. e., of definitions «introduced for explanatory purposes» (SA, 3) . Unlike a notational definition, a constructional de finition defines everyday or pre system atic ex pres sions while preserving their original interpretation. It serves to clarify the presystematic domain by reaching both economy (a reduction of primitive terms) and a systematic order (SA, 47f). «To economize and to systematize are the same» (SA, 48). In order to serve this purpose, a constructional de finition does not only have to fulfill formal requirements: «A con struc tional de finition is correct -apart from formal considerations -if the range of application of its definiens is the same as that of the definiendum. Nothing more is required than that the two expressions have identical extensions» (SA, 3). This, in turn, calls for what Goodman labels «extensional isomorphism» (SA, 10). The picture that is construed does not simply reflect the presystem atic domain. But still it is restricted to the applic ations which are generally ac cepted as right in the original symbolic practice.
In «The Revision of Philosophy» Goodman explains this method as a matter of mapping: «The function of a constructional system», he writes, «is not to recreate experience but rather to map it» (PP, 15) . Consequently, in a construc tional definition the symbol «=df» is to be read as «is here to be mapped as» (PP, 18). Here we get a distinct idea of Goodman's way of systematizing: to systematize is to simplify and organize a given domain for the sake of clari fication: The purpose of a system is not to re present the world (to make knowledge available) but to arrange what we already know (to make knowledge serviceable). A map would be useless if it copied the world; and likewise, a mere reproduction of the world is no reasonable aim. Goodman describes the function of a map as follows:
A map is schematic, selective, con ventional, condensed, and uniform. And these character istics are virtues rather than defects. The map not only sum marizes, clarifies, and syste ma tizes, it often dis closes facts we could hardly learn im mediately from our ex plorations. We may make larger and more complicated maps or even three-dimen sional models in order to record more information; but this is not always to the good. For when our map be comes as large and in all other re spects the same as the territory mapped -and indeed long before this stage is reached -the purposes of a map are no longer served. (PP, 15) A map does not grasp what is already there. A good map systematizes a field and contributes to its disclosure. It delivers a perspective that allows us to deal with things; i. e., it brings a world into sight. So a map is a medium of world orientation. And insofar as mapping is the central goal of Goodman's philosophy, it is a philosophy of world disclosure and world orientation: It aims not at understanding the world in the first place, but at under standing our own ways of understanding (WW, 21f). Therefore it is justified to say that Goodman's conception of philosophy is close akin to Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as gram mar. Goodman's idea of «mapmaking» can be interpreted as a variation of Witt gen stein's idea of über sichtliche Darstellung -a term which can roughly be trans lated as surveyable represent ation 1 . In the conception of language games, the aim is to find repre sent ations that allow us to «know our way about» 2 . Like wise, Good man's philo sophy of mapmaking does not aim at «a portrayal of the process of acquiring knowledge» or «the genesis [...] of ideas» (PP, 10). The criterion of truth does not apply: «The relevant question about a system or a map is whether it is serviceable and accurate in the way intended» (PP, 16).
Below, I suggest that the conception of mapmaking reaches into Goodman's later thought which hence can be interpreted as a project of surveyable re pre sent ation in the sense described. In the philosophy of worldmaking, symbols are taken as a condition of understanding: They neither grasp the world in itself nor obscure the sight, but make world views possible. Symbols constitute the perspectives that allow reality to come into sight. In a slogan: World making is mapmaking.
Worldmaking as mapmaking
At first sight, it seems that constructional systems got lost in the later general theory of symbols, as developed in Languages of Art. In actual fact, though, symbol systems are descendants of constructional systems. Just as the metatheory of The Structure of Appearance demands, a symbol system includes both its symbols and its interpretation (LA, 40 and Hellman 1977, XX) . It is not an institution waiting to be described but a result of a reconstruction -i. e., one recon struction out of many. Also, Good man's tendency to look down on everyday symbolic practice appears in quite a different light, given the pur pose of his philosophizing. He does not ignore the prag matic or social dimension of sign use. Indeed this dimension is always present in the back ground. Only, his relation to everyday practice is determined by the purpose of clari fication. In Goodman's later work this methodology - the more developed form of the metatheory of The Structure of Appearance - often goes under the heading of nominalism. This label has given rise to many misunderstandings as it has regularly been interpreted as an epistemological or even metaphysical stance 3 . However, Goodman emphasizes again and again that his nominalism has a methodological sense. In his early writings we find the explanation that nominalism «does not involve excluding abstract entities, spirits, intimations of immortality, or anything of the sort; but requires only that whatever is admitted as an entity at all be con strued as an individual» (PP, 157, emphasis added) 4 . So the concept of nominalism, here, has no ontological sense at all, it concerns the method of re construction exclusively; it is a technique. The idea is: In order to systematize well one should restrict oneself to individual elements 5 . What looks like onto logy at first sight turns out to be a rule of thumb for clarification purposes - a rule, by the way, to which Goodman more than once makes exceptions (LA, xiii).
So the explanations of nominalism in Languages of Art or Ways of World making have an exclusively methodological sense. They are usually short, and
Good man more or less contents himself with reference to his earlier writings (LA, 156; WW, 10, 94-96 and 100f; MM, 29f). This might be one of the reasons why his nominalism has so often been mistaken for a meta physical doctrine. However, many elements of Goodman's late pluralism become nearly unintelligible if one loses sight of its basic methodology and its practical purpose. The debate about starmaking (McCormick 1996 , Scheffler 1999 , Scheffler 2001 ) can serve as an example: It seems fair to discuss how a radical pluralism like Goodman's can ever be justified; to many it seems that the idea of a «pluriverse» is completely counterintuitive and has to pro voke realist rejoinders. But a closer look shows that the whole debate might be beside the point: Goodman's pluralism does not have an ontological sense at all, it does not want to be a «sweeping general doctrine» (MM, 43). It is hardly ever noticed how peculiar Good man's contributions to this subject are: «I by no means insist that there are many worlds - or indeed any», he writes in Ways of World making (WW, 96) . There is no fixed number of symbol worlds as a world is regarded as actual if a world description is recognized as right (WW, 94).
Shottenkirk (2009) argues that to understand Goodman's philosophy one has to read
Goodman's work as a whole. In particular, the nominalism of The Strucure of Appearance had to be accounted for. For Shottenkirk, though, this means that Good man's «Metaphysics is an explication of Goodman's basic nominalist ontology and logic, and it is upon those principles that he builds his epi stemology» (ibid., vii (MM, 43; Goodman 1996, 203f) . Similarly, Goodman defends irrealism against Putnam's «common sense realism» only insofar as «irrealism can by no means brook any acceptance of commonsense at face value but at most as only presystematic discourse urgent ly requiring critical examination and organization into wellmade versions» (Goodman 1996, 205) . Ob viously, the idea of constructional systems is in the background here, and indeed the passage includes a reference to Goodman's early work. It should have become clear by now that Goodman's later philosophy is still deeply in formed by the early idea of constructional systems. It is not so much a doctrine, a theory, but rather a technique of clarification, a practice that I suggest to call practice of perspicuous re presentation. In the following sections I will ask for some implic ations of this approach. My assumption is that some of the difficulties to do justice to Goodman's project derive from the fact that he himself keeps using the language of epistemology. I will first make some remarks on the topic of epistemology in general and after that make a suggestion how to understand the term «critique of world making».
The language of representation
In his paper «A world of individuals» Goodman writes that the philosopher's «task is to interrelate, systematize, interpret, explain». Then he continues as fol lows: «He [sc. the philosopher] is driven not by practical needs but by an im practical desire to understand. He, too, will judge a system by how well it works; but a system works for him only to the extent that it clarifies» (PP, 169). Similarly, in Languages of Art, Goodman says, that the «primary purpose» of symbolizing was «cognition in and for it self». In this context, any practical, in particular communicative purposes are ex cluded: «[...] com mu ni cation is secondary to the appre hen sion and formulation of what is to be com municated» (LA, 258). -So rhetorically, the weight is clearly put on the cognitive dimension. The crucial point is: Goodman himself tends to describe his technique of world orientation by using the terms of epistemological theory. This is what I want to discuss. Is it plausible to understand a project like Goodman's as an epistemological project? The critique of theory of knowl edge in general is known since Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit and has been carried forward by authors like Heidegger, Wittgenstein or Merleau-Ponty. The problems are especially obvious in the case of foundationalism. But one might have a suspicion that this is only the tip of the iceberg: In this spirit, Charles Taylor claims that epistemology does not have to be «overcome» in its foundationalist form only as the core of the problem is the repre sentationalism implied in the idea of a theory of knowl edge (Taylor 1987, 9f) . According to Taylor, the critique of epi stemology has its fundament in the rejection of the modern premise that there are «ideas» that have intentional content and point to the world, whereas Kant shows that it is unintelligible how anything could have these properties all at once. Knowl edge cannot be separated from practical standpoints, it has its ultimate fundament in the «agent's knowl edge» (Taylor 1987, 10f) . But if this is right, then the idea of epistemology becomes problematic as such. The idea of privileged represent ations mirroring the world is not specifically foundationalist, like Rorty suggests; it is not restricted to the ideology of knowl edge atoms (Rorty 1979) . In actual fact, the possib ility to differentiate wrong and right re presentations from a privileged standpoint beyond human practice is blocked in general. If epistemology is an attempt to catch up with everyday epistemic judg ments, to solve the question of reliable knowl edge by theory, then epistemology has come to an end. At the bottom of world re presen tations we will not find world representations more fundamental, but in articulate human practice (Taylor 1987, 14) . This practice, though -this is one of the central insights in the late Wittgenstein -can neither be overviewed nor re produced in theory as it is subtle and fine-spun as a spider's web (Wittgenstein 1953, § 106) . This is why we cannot distance our selves from our own beingintheworld, as expressed in the language of phenomenology. The only thing we can ask for is an analysis for the purpose of orientation and dis closure. The basic mistake of representa tionalist epistemology is that it does ask for more. But in fact, we cannot judge world descriptions from a scientific, unengaged position. Philosophy cannot deliver fixed criteria but only help to make considered judgments, invent concepts, explicate the back ground of knowledge, help us to know our way about. Its task is not to represent cognitive processes but to make maps within the practice of under stand ing. All we can do is to support epistemic practice.
If this is what Goodman does -if it is right to describe his project as one of making maps and surveyable representations -, then his emphasis on the «primacy of cognition» is wholly misleading. The primacy of clarification includes a primacy of human practice and its purposes. When Goodman describes his philosophy as «examin ation and comparison of the ways we make what we make [...] and of the criteria we use in judging what we make» (MM, 43) , he cannot take a standpoint out side practice but only within. The notion of symbol, introduced as a «very general and color less term» (LA, xi), should then be taken as a philosophical instrument that does not refer to representations of reality or even «ideas» in Locke's sense. In particular, it does not serve to differentiate right renderings from wrong ones 6 . The German «Darstellung» that Wittgenstein uses can help to grasp this point. Unlike the term «Vorstel-lung» (usually corresponding to «representation»), «Darstellung» refers to a practice of the forming presentations that has standards of its own and is not bound to given facts whatsoever. This explains why the criteria of rightness that Goodman mentions -e. g., correctness, coher ence, purposefulness and «along with truth, standards of accepta bility that some times supple ment or even com-6. This is especially obvious in the fact that Goodman never describes criteria to sort out wrong symbol izations. Rather, whenever he speaks of world versions he speaks of right symbolizations. LA, 3f.
pete with truth where it applies, or re place truth for non declarative ren der ings» (WW, 110) -cannot count as epi stemological standards but are criteria «we use», i. e., criteria of everyday's human practice. The assumption of «multiple actual worlds» (WW, 2, emphasis added) which is central to Goodman's pluralism relates to an assumption of a variety of symbolic practices with specific rules and criteria that the philosopher can never hope to exhaust. One might say: Human practice is no subject in Goodman's philosophy as he does not distance himself from practice but adopts a practical standpoint. His attempt is to clarify practice from a stand point of finiteness. In the last section, I examine the project of a critique of worldmaking in this sense a bit more closely. It has already been shown that Goodman's project can be read as a conception of world disclosure (Ortland 2001 , Seel 1993 ). I will focus on the idea of critique as a matter of world orientation.
Beyond representation
Goodman's thinking can be understood as an effort of mapping, built upon a method of über sichtliche Darstellung. One could say: His philo sophy of worldmaking is a philo sophy of world orientation in the corset of epi stemology. But as the idea of looking at the epistemic practice from the side is dropped, the aim can no longer be to find «privileged representations». Rather, it is an attempt to clarify the ongoing practice in order to support «considered judgments» (Elgin 1996) . The purpose of Goodman's philo sophy is orientation and clarification. In this respect, his philo sophy is close to Wittgenstein's and, maybe less obviously, to Kant's.
Kant's thinking is motivated by the observation that the world cannot be experienced as a totality, that the unity of the whole can only be an «idea». The antinomy of the two perspectives of free dom and nature is the most well known motive in this context; it is the starting point of Kant's philosophy. The result is not a theory but a critique of knowledge: i. e., a differ entiation of domains of judg ments, each having its own rules and criteria 7 . Such an approach does not aim at epistemology but at an orientation in thinking 8 .
If the notion of a «critique of worldmaking» has a Kantian sense, then it should be possible to find, at least, hints into this direction. Indeed, Goodman's «irreconcilable con flict of world versions» plays quite a similar role as Kant's antinomy 9 . It is the starting point that opens up a critical (as opposed to metaphysical) per spec tive: Goodman's turn from truth to rightness does not only derive from a modi fication of standards. It implies, before all, a pluraliza 7. The most radical interpretation of this Kantian thought is to be found in Jean-François Lyotard's Le Différend. It would be interesting to compare Lyotard's account of a différend to Goodman's account of irreconcilable conflicts: Lyotard 1983, 9 and WW, 109-116 . For an attempt see Leeten 2010, 243-248. 8 . This aspect in Kant's philosophy is developed in Kant (1786) : «Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren?». 9. Cf. WW, Ch. VII and, with reference to Kant's antinomies, MM, 32. tion of standards and the idea of a multitude of domains. But where a plurality of criteria is allowed, the standards of science are some among many others and the philosopher loses his privileged position. Which standards have to be applied cannot be decided by reflection alone -like any vote for a particular metaphysical stance, e. g., Quine's vote for physical ism (Quine 1981) , seems to presuppose. The conflict between monism and pluralism, here, is not simply a conflict of two epistemological ap proaches; it is a conflict between an epistemo logical approach and an approach that does not claim privileged knowledge any longer but has become a part of human practice. Philo sophy, then, does not serve the purpose of discovering truths about the world but rather of handling our understanding of the world.
Considering that this account is right: The general theory of symbols then should indeed better be understood as a practical conception, akin to positions of world orientation or world disclosure. Many aspects of Goodman's thinking should become clearer if interpreted in a non-epistemological frame. But this is not all: If Goodman's philosophy is a philosophy of practice in the sense de scribed, then it has its value not in itself. The crucial question would be what we make of it. As a system of categorization the symbol theory would be a means of thinking, namely an instrument for clarification purposes, and its value would show itself in its use alone. Goodman himself writes: «For a categorical system, what needs to be shown is not that it is true but what it can do» (WW, 129). The general theory of symbols is a categorical system. So the question cannot be whether it is a true doctrine but what we can do with it. Such a reception of Goodman's philosophy is still to be explored.
